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JURORS AS NONVOLUNTARY EMPLOYEES UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
Jury service can be both beneficial and burdensome: beneficial
to our legal system, but burdensome to the individual citizen re-
quired to serve. It can be particularly burdensome if the juror
loses his regular employment benefits while he is serving.
The Superior Court of New Jersey in Silagy v. State1 may have
increased the burden of the juror. The plaintiff in that case had
been ordered by the county to serve on a jury. While serving,
she tripped on a rubber mat, injuring her foot and ankle. To de-
fray the resulting medical expenses, plaintiff sought workmen's
compensation benefits. She sought them from the county, on the
theory that a juror is an employee of the county. Alternatively,
she sought benefits from her regular employer, on the theory that
her jury service was an extension of her regular employment. She
was not allowed compensation from either source. The court noted
that plaintiff had served the county under compulsion of law
rather than under contract.2 The compulsory nature of her service
was held to preclude her from being deemed an employee of the
county, the term "employee" being statutorily defined as one "who
perform(s) service for an employer for financial considera-
tion. . . ." Likewise she did not qualify as an employee of her
regular employer. The court reached this conclusion by ruling
that the jury service was beyond the scope of her regular employ-
ment.
4
The Silagy case is one of several dozen cases which have dealt
with the issue of whether a person who renders services under
compulsion of law should be deemed an "employee" and so brought
within the coverage of the workmen's compensation acts. This
Note will examine the several classes of cases concerning claimants
who have been injured while serving under compulsion of law.
Attention will be focused on the juror, and particularly on whether
his situation is distinguishable from similar cases. In the light of
these examinations, and after a consideration of the underlying
philosophy of workmen's compensation, a determination will be
made of the soundness of the Silagy decision.
1. 105 N.J. Super. 507, 253 A.2d 478 (1969).
2. Id. at 509, 253 A.2d at 479.
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36 (1959).
4. 105 N.J. Super. at 510, 253 A.2d at 479.
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THE NATURE OF WORKVIEN'S COMPENSATION
Before the Silagy issues are examined, a few general remarks
should be made concerning the nature of workmen's compensation.
Workmen's compensation is a system designed to allocate the
cost of work-connected injuries in an efficient, certain, and fair
manner." The system is entirely statutory; the right of the in-
dividual worker to receive workmen's compensation benefits de-
pends on the provisions of the applicable statute and on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case." Some states require all eligible
employers and employees to participate in their workmen's com-
pensation programs, 7 while others only require designated classes
of employers or employees to participate, and allow the other
eligible classes to participate at their option.8 Some states make
participation optional for all eligible employers or employees.9 In
most states the employers who participate in the program are per-
mitted to make private insurance arrangements; generally, they
can either carry liability insurance or act as "self-insurers."'10
The liability of the employer is a "liability without fault."
The employer is liable so long as his employee's injury was work-
connected.1 ' Negligence is immaterial. Employers are willing to
accept this "liability without fault" because they are granted im-
munity from common law suits.1 2 This means that the relatively
high jury verdicts under common law are replaced by relatively
low assessments under compensation law.13  The assessments
against the employer are relatively low under compensation law
because they are only designed to partially compensate the work-
man for his reduced earning capacity 4 and for the medical ex-
penses he has incurred. 5 The assessments are not designed to
compensate him for all actual losses or for any pain and suffering."
Employees are willing to accept the workmen's compensation
provisions because they are assured conveniently obtainable bene-
5. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.20 (1968).
6. Flynn v. Union City, 32 N.J. Super. 518, 108 A.2d 629 (1954).




10. Id.; 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 3.10 (1968).
11. 1 A. LARSON, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW § 2.10 (1968).
12. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (1969).
13. 1 A. LARSON, WORK1aIN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 2.40-2.50 (1968).
14. Id.
15. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 61.11 (1968).
16. 1 A. LASON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.40 (1968).
fits without regard to fault.
The goal of compensation law is to have the consumer of a
product ultimately bear the cost of producing the product.17 This
goal is effected by a two step process. First, the employer is re-
quired to absorb the cost of work-connected injuries, as he absorbs
the expense of machinery depreciation. The employer then passes
the cost of the injuries to the consumer in the form of higher
prices. Thus, the burden of supporting incapacitated workmen is
ultimately shifted from the general public to the specific consumers
who benefit from the workmen's labors.' s
THE HISTORY OF CLAIMS BY JURORS
Five cases comprise the history of the issues litigated in the
Silagy case. 19 In all of these cases, the claimants sought workmen's
compensation benefits. The benefits were alleged to be due be-
cause the claimants sustained injuries or contracted a disease in
the course of rendering jury services. In all five cases the claim-
ants sought benefits from the county only. The juror's additional
claim in Silagy against her regular employer presents an issue
which has not been previously decided by the courts, and which
is beyond the scope of the discussion in this Note. 2
In Industrial Commission v. Rogers2' the plaintiff was injured
on the courthouse stairs while serving as a juror. She contended
that at the time of her injury she was an employee of the county
17. Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 18 N.J. 195, 113 A.2d 513
(1955).
18. 1 A. LARSON, WORKuMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.20 (1968).
19. Board of Comm'rs. v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 255 (1936);
Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 363 Mich. 648, 110 N.W.2d 780 (1961); Seward
v. County of Bernalillo, 61 N.M. 52, 294 P.2d 625 (1956); Hicks v. Guilford
County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966); Industrial Comm'n. v. Rogers,
122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930).
20. In order for a juror to recover workmen's compensation benefits
from his regular employer he would have to show that jury duty is
within the scope of his regular employment. This is difficult to show.
The juror would have to contend either that jury service is of indirect
benefit to his employer, or that his employer had, for patriotic reasons,
voluntarily extended the scope of employment to cover jury duty. Even
if the juror can establish these claims, he is still confronted with the argu-
ment that the regular employer has no right of control over him while
he is serving as a juror.
The special facts of the Sitagy case lend some support to plaintiff's
claim therein against her regular employer. The regular employer in
Silagy was the state and it continued to pay plaintiff her regular wages
while she served as a juror. Apparently the state did this for the purpose
of aiding its judicial department in obtaining qualified jurors. The court
in Silagy recognized that there is plausible merit in granting compensa-
tion benefits to state employees who serve as jurors, but felt that the
decision to grant these benefits must come from either the legislature or
the court of last resort. 105 N.J. Super. at 510, 253 A.2d at 479. For a more
complete discussion of this issue see Silagy v. State, 101 N.J. Super. 455,
244 A.2d 542 (Mercer County Ct. 1968).
21. 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930).
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according to the statutory definition of "employee" which includes
one who serves "under any appointment or contract of hire, ex-
press or implied, oral or written .... ,22
The county argued that the meager compensation given jurors
is not an adequate consideration for serving.23 Therefore, it could
not be said that plaintiff served for the purpose of receiving con-
sideration. Rather, argued the county, the plaintiff served because
she had no option to decline. These circumstances did not comport
with the county's understanding of "hiring." That term was under-
stood by the county to mean the giving of adequate consideration
in return for the receiving of services voluntarily rendered. Since
in the juror's case there was neither a giving of adequate consider-
ation nor a receiving of voluntarily rendered services, the county
argued that there was no "hiring" and hence no "appointment or
contract of hire". Thus, plaintiff did not qualify as an employee
of the county under the statutory definition and should be denied
compensation coverage.
The Ohio Supreme Court was of a different opinion. The com-
pensation for jury service was fixed by statute, and the court felt
that it could not declare such compensation inadequate.24 Hence
in the court's view, the plaintiff was appointed by the jury commis-
sion and was provided with valuable consideration in return for
her services. There was thus an "appointment of hire." Plaintiff's
motivation in serving was deemed immaterial. Whether she served
for civic reasons, or to earn money, or to avoid being held in con-
tempt of court, the result would be the same; she would be an
employee serving under an appointment of hire. As such, she was
eligible for workmen's compensation benefits.
The opposite conclusion was reached in Colorado in Board of
Commissioners v. Evans.2 5 The same situation confronted the
court, with the exception that the juror was an elderly man who
contracted pneumonia when lodged overnight without a blanket.
The Colorado statutory definition of "employee", like the Ohio
definition,26 includes "[e] very person in the service of the state, or
of any county ... under any appointment or contract of hire, ex-
press or implied .... -27 The court hinged its decision on whether
or not there was a contract between the plaintiff and the county.
22. OHio RE'. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (A) (Baldwin Supp. 1968).
23. 122 Ohio St. at 138, 171 N.E. at 36.
24. Id. at 139, 171 N.E. at 37.
25. 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1936).
26. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (A) (Baldwin Supp. 1968).
27. COLO. REv. STAT. AN. § 81-2-7 (1963).
It was first noted that the county had not negotiated for the plain-
tiff's services, nor had the plaintiff applied to the county for em-
ployment. 28 Further, there was no consultation between the par-
ties regarding the terms of plaintiff's service. Finally, the plain-
tiff's decisions, while serving as juror, were not subject to the con-
trol of the county. Thus, missing were the elements of a contract:
application, negotiation, consultation, voluntary service, and the
right of control over the employee. For these reasons the court
concluded that the plaintiff was not under contract as an em-
ployee of the county. Rather, he occupied a more elevated posi-
tion.29 Consequently, he was not covered by the compensation act.
The remainder of the juror cases have been in accord with
the Evans decision. New Mexico followed Evans without comment
in Seward v. County of Bernalillo.30 Michigan then decided the
question in Jochen v. County of Saginaw." The Jochen decision
contains a thorough discussion on the juror's right to workmen's
compensation benefits. The court, in reaching a result adverse to
the plaintiff juror, split three ways. Three justices disposed of the
case on the ground that the plaintiff's injury occurred before she
actually assumed the duties of a juror.32 Three concurring justices
were of the opinion that the plaintiff was serving as a juror at the
time of the accident, but that she still did not qualify for com-
pensation coverage.33 Two justices dissented.
4
The three concurring justices introduced new arguments
against granting compensation coverage. They contended that the
fees given jurors are not meant as wages in payment for their
services. Rather, the fees are meant as gratuities to cover ex-
penses.33 The concurring justices also raised the question of who
did the "appointing" if it be deemed that there was an "appoint-
ment". 6 The concurring justices reasoned that for there to be an
"appointment" there must be an officer who exercises discretion in
selecting the juror. However, the plaintiff's name had been drawn
wholly by chance from the lists of citizens compiled by city offi-
cials. No officer had exercised any discretion except for the offi-
cials who compiled the original lists. This situation was viewed as
distinguishable from the Rogers case.3 7 In that case, the selection
of the plaintiff as juror had been made by a jury commission.
The concurring justices felt that the commission's role in the plain-
28. 99 Colo. at 86, 60 P.2d at 226.
29. Id. at 86, 60 P.2d at 227.
30. 61 N.M. 52, 294 P.2d 625 (1956).
31. 363 Mich. 648, 110 N.W.2d 780 (1961).
32. Id. at 648, 110 N.W.2d at 780.
33. Id. at 662, 110 N.W.2d at 781 (concurring opinion).
34. Id. at 651, 110 N.W.2d at 786 (dissenting opinion).
35. Id. at 668, 110 N.W.2d at 784 (concurring opinion).
36. Id. at 666, 110 N.W.2d at 783 (concurring opinion).
37. Industrial Comm'n. v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930),
discussed at notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
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tiff's selection in Rogers might account for that court's decision
that there had been an "appointment of hire".
A final argument was voiced by the concurring justices. It
was based on the contention that workmen's compensation benefits
form an exclusive remedy. 38 Any employee deemed eligible for this
remedy is excluded from the common law remedies. The con-
curring justices contended that this exclusive nature of workmen's
compensation makes it restrictive, and, since it is restrictive, its
coverage should not be extended to include questionable cases.
Thus the juror, being a questionable case, should be excluded from
workmen's compensation coverage.
In dissent 39 two justices declared that the compensation acts
are remedial, not restrictive. The purpose of the acts, according
to the dissenters, is to remedy the deficiencies in the common law
rights of employees. 40 The dissenting justices noted that the acts
should therefore be liberally construed. The general rule was said
to be that a compensation act should be extended "to include all
employments and services which can reasonably be said to come
under its provisions and so construed that in a doubtful case an
injured employee may not be deprived of the benefits of the act."'4 '
Regarding the issue of whether or not there was an "appoint-
ment", the dissenting justices argued that the plaintiff had been
personally chosen and summoned. This was thought to be suffi-
cient to constitute receipt of an "appointment" to jury duty.
42
Hicks v. Guilford County43 is the last of the five juror cases
decided prior to Silagy. The facts were the same as in the other
cases; the decision was adverse to the plaintiff juror. The North
Carolina Supreme Court stressed the test of control. An "appoint-
ment or contract of hire ... express or implied, oral or writ-
ten .... ,,44 was held not to exist when the employer has no right
to control the manner in which the employee is to render his
services. 45 The court found that the county had no such control
over jurors; the county had only the right to require jurors to
conform with their legal duties.
The court also considered the argument that workmen's com-
pensation acts should be liberally construed. It held that the lib-
38. 363 Mich. at 665, 110 N.W.2d at 782 (concurring opinion).
39. Id. at 651, 110 N.W.2d at 786 (dissenting opinion).
40. Id. at 656, 110 N.W.2d at 788 (dissenting opinion).
41. Id. at 656, 110 N.W.2d at 789 (dissenting opinion).
42. Id. at 661, 110 N.W.2d at 791 (dissenting opinion).
43. 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1965).
45. 267 N.C. at 367, 148 S.E.2d at 243.
eral construction rule does not apply to provisions specifying the
types of employees covered.46 Thus, in the court's opinion, the
statutory definition of "employee" should not be so liberally con-
strued as to bring a juror under the coverage of the act.
THE REQUIREMENT OF A CONTRACT OF HIRE
Most compensation acts require the existence of a contract of
hire.47 The requirement of a contract limits the liability of the
employer by making him liable only for injuries arising out of
definite and mutually agreed upon employment arrangements.
This limitation on the employer's liability is reasonable since it
protects him from being held strictly liable to unsolicited and un-
wanted workers.
The requirement of a contract of hire is thus intended for the
protection of the employer. The question arises as to whether the
contract requirement has any other purposes. It can be argued
that the contract requirement is also intended to prevent nonvol-
untary workers from being covered by compensation law. To ac-
complish the purpose of excluding nonvoluntary workers, the con-
tract of hire requirement must be interpreted as requiring not
only that the employer and employee agree to the employment
contract, but also that they agree voluntarily.
Whether the contract requirement should be interpreted so as
to exclude nonvoluntary workers is not settled. Several classes of
cases, in addition to the ones involving jurors, have considered the
issue. In each of these cases there is a definite agreement between
the person serving and the recipient of the services; the terms of
the agreement are usually governed by statute, are agreed to by
the recipient of the services, and are complied with by the person
serving. The person serving is usually compensated for his serv-
ices. The only difficulty lies in the fact that the person does not
serve voluntarily.
The primary issue in these cases is the eligibility of the claim-
ant for workmen's compensation benefits. Resolution of the eligi-
bility issue depends on whether the claimant is deemed to be an
employee. His employee status in turn hinges on whether he is
held to be serving under a contract of hire. And satisfaction of
the contract requirement depends on whether the court interprets
the phrase "contract of hire" as requiring voluntary participation
in the contract by the employee.
CASES INVOLVING COMPULSORY SERVICE
In the class of cases dealing with the impressment of citizens
into public service, the courts have found the citizen's nonvolun-
46. Id. at 366, 148 S.E.2d at 242.
47. 1A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 43.00 (1968).
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tary participation to be no obstacle. In these impressment cases,
an officer having statutory authority typically orders a citizen to
render temporary assistance. The officer may be a sheriff,4 8 dep-
uty sheriff,4 inspector having the powers of a deputy sheriff,50
constable,5 1 village marshal,5 2 town marshal, 5 forest warden,54 po-
liceman," or fireman.50 These impressment cases have uniformly
held that a sufficient appointment or contract of hire exists to
bring the impressed citizens within the coverage of compensation
law. Yet in all cases the citizen's participation is not voluntary.
Like the juror, he serves under compulsion of law.
There are two distinctions between the impressed citizen and
the juror. First, the terms of the "contract" between the officer
and the impressed citizen are usually not as definite as is the case
with the juror. Typically such elements as wages and duration
are not even mentioned in the case of the impressed citizen. This
lack of specificity is a consequence of the emergency conditions
under which the citizen is usually impressed. The effect of this
distinction regarding the specificity of the employment contract
is that the requisites of a contract of hire appear more easily dis-
cernible in the case of a juror than in the case of an impressed
citizen.
The second distinction concerns the degree of supervision re-
tained by the employer. It has been argued that an officer has
tight control over the impressed citizen, while the county has no
such control over its jurors.57 This distinction in supervision sug-
gests that the impressed citizen, being more rigidly controlled, is
an employee, whereas a juror is not.
48. Monterey County v. Rader, 199 Cal. 221, 248 P. 912 (1926); Sexton
v. County of Waseca, 211 Minn. 422, 1 N.W.2d 394 (1941); Anderson v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., 155 Neb. 590, 52 N.W.2d 814 (1952); Millard County
v. Industrial Comm'n., 62 Utah 46, 217 P. 974 (1923).
49. Eaton v. Bernalillo County, 46 N.M. 318, 128 P.2d 738 (1942);
Mitchell v. Industrial Comm'n., 57 Ohio App. 319, 13 N.E.2d 736 (1936);
Gulbrandson v. Town of Midland, 72 S.D. 461, 36 N.W.2d 655 (1949).
50. Shawano County v. Industrial Comm'n., 219 Wis. 513, 263 N.W.
590 (1935).
51. Leon County v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 171, 9 So. 2d 461 (1942).
52. Village of West Salem v. Industrial Comm'n., 162 Wis. 57, 155 N.W.
929 (1916).
53. Gulbrandson v. Town of Midland, 72 S.D. 461, 36 N.W.2d 655
(1949).
54. Moore v. State, 200 N.C. 300, 156 S.E. 806 (1931).
55. Tomlinson v. Town of Norwood, 208 N.C. 716, 182 S.E. 659 (1935).
56. Tennis v. City of Sturgis, 75 S.D. 17, 58 N.W.2d 301 (1953).
57. Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 367, 148 S.E.2d 240, 243
(1966).
341
In another line of cases, the nonvoluntary nature of the claim-
ant's work has uniformly been held to bar recovery. These cases
involve prisoners. Watson v. Industrial Commission58 is typical.
The claimant therein was a prisoner. As such he was required to
work, but he "volunteered" for special work in return for which
his sentence was reduced. Thus, like the juror case, there is present
in the Watson case the elements of a contract (mutual agreement
and an incentive for working) as well as the element of nonvolun-
tary service (the claimant was required by law to work). These
elements are also present in the other prisoner cases. In some, the
prisoner's incentive for working is financial.5 9 In others, the in-
centive is an expectation of receiving privileges,60 a reduced sen-
tence,61 or rehabilitation.6 2 In some cases, there is no provision for
any incentives.63 In all cases the prisoner is either required to
work or else his work is deemed nonvoluntary regardless of his
attitude on the ground that if he hadn't "volunteered" to work he
could have been required to work.64 The rationale of these
prisoner cases is uniform. A prisoner does not work voluntarily for
wages; he works nonvoluntarily. In return for his work, he may
receive gratuities or privileges, but the gratuities or privileges are
given to encourage good conduct and are not meant as wages. The
holdings of these prisoner cases are also uniform. A prisoner work-
ing nonvoluntarily is ineligible for compensation benefits. 65 Trea-
tise writers, on the other hand, have persuasively argued in favor
of granting such benefits to prisoners.66
A third class of cases is divided in its treatment of nonvolun-
tary services. The services in this third class of cases are rendered
by militiamen while on duty. Some courts have held that militia-
men qualify for workmen's compensation benefits as employees of
the state under a contract of hire.67 Other courts have held that
58. 100 Ariz. 327, 414 P.2d 144 (1966).
59. Jones v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 134 So. 2d 377 (La. App.
1961); Kroth v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 408 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1965).
60. Shain v. State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292, 291 P.2d 870 (1955).
61. Watson v. Industrial Comm'n., 100 Ariz. 327, 414 P.2d 144 (1966);
Goff v. Union County, 26 N.J. Misc. 135, 57 A.2d 480 (N.J. Dep't. L. 1948).
62. Moats v. State, 215 Md. 49, 136 A.2d 757 (1957); Brown v. James-
burg State Home for Boys, 60 N.J. Super. 123, 158 A.2d 445 (1960).
63. Lawson v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App. 85, 139 S.E. 96 (1927);
Miller v. City of Boise, 70 Idaho 137, 212 P.2d 654 (1949).
64. Scott v. City of Hobbs, 69 N.M. 330, 366 P.2d 854 (1961).
65. Cases cited notes 58-64 supra; Schraner v. State Dep't. of Correc-
tion, 135 Ind. App. 504, 189 N.E.2d 119 (1963); Greene's Case, 280 Mass.
506, 182 N.E. 857 (1932); Murray County v. Hood, 163 Okla. 167, 21 P.2d
754 (1933).
66. See, e.g., S. HORovrrz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS 178 (1948); 1A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LAw § 47.31 (1968).
67. Andrews v. State, 53 Ariz. 475, 90 P.2d 995 (1939); Griffith v.
Nat'l. Guard, 70 Idaho 88, 212 P.2d 403 (1949); Baker v. State, 200 N.C.
232, 156 S.E. 917 (1931); Globe Indem. Co. v. Forrest, 165 Va. 267, 182
S.E. 215 (1935); State v. Johnson, 186 Wis. 1, 202 N.W. 191 (1925).
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they do not.6 8 The typical reason for denying workmen's compen-
sation coverage is that the militiaman's work is not voluntary. His
enlistment, though voluntary, is construed as resulting from the
duty he owes the sovereign and not from an attempt to make a con-
tract of employment. Once in the sovereign's service, a militiaman,
like a juror, must take orders and cannot terminate his service at
will. These factors are deemed sufficient, by the one group of
cases, 9 to make the militiaman's service nonvoluntary, and being
nonvoluntary, to render him ineligible for workmen's compensation
benefits.
The other group of cases 70 allows workmen's compensation
benefits. It should be noted, however, that the decisions permit-
ting compensation are based on a fact situation which might be
distinguished from the juror cases; the militiaman is initially un-
der less constraint to serve than is a juror.
A fact situation more in point with the juror case was pre-
sented in Rector v. Cherry Valley Timber Co. 7 1 In that case a
soldier was ordered to work for a civilian employer. He received
regular wages from the employer. The soldier was held to be
eligible for workmen's compensation benefits for injuries suffered
while working for the civilian employer. The fact that the soldier
did not voluntarily agree to work for the civilian employer was
held to be no bar. The court ruled that regardless of how the
soldier came to be in the Army, and regardless of how he came
to be in the employ of the civilian employer, the result was the
same. The soldier's actions, being in response to the duty he owes
the government, are voluntary in the contemplation of the law.
7 2
This proposition, if extended to the case of a juror, would obviate
the need for deciding whether his nonvoluntary service should bar
his recovery of compensation benefits; the juror's service would
simply be deemed "voluntary" in the contemplation of the law.
In a somewhat similar case, Peterson v. Twentieth Century
Fox Films,7 3 a member of the Navy was ordered to assist a motion
picture company. The court decided that such a situation did not
give rise to a contract of hire between the seaman and the motion
68. Hays v. Illinois Terminal Transp. Co., 363 Ill. 397, 2 N.E.2d 309
(1936); Lind v. Nebraska Nat'l. Guard, 144 Neb.- 122, 12 N.W.2d 652 (1944);
Goldstein v. State, 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939); Thompson v. Dep't.
of Labor & Indus., 194 Wash. 396, 78 P.2d 170 (1938).
69. Cases cited note_ 67 supra.
70. Cases cited note 68 supra.
71. 115 Wash. 31, 196 P. 653 (1921).
72. Id. at 33, 196 P. at 653
73. 76 Cal. App. 2d 587, 173 P.2d 851 (1946).
picture company, and consequently the seaman was not eligible for
workmen's compensation benefits from the company.
Two additional cases have involved nonvoluntary services. In
one, Board of Trustees v. State Industrial Commission.7 4 the claim-
ant furnished four days of road work pursuant to a statute. Failure
to comply with the statute was a misdemeanor. The court decided
that such nonvoluntary work was outside the purview of compen-
sation law.
In the other, Hollowell v. North Carolina Department of Con-
servation and Development,7 5 a witness under subpoena was as-
saulted as a result of his testimony. He sought workmen's com-
pensation benefits on the theory that he was an employee of the
party who had him subpoenaed. Again, the court decided that the
claimant's services, being nonvoluntary, were outside the coverage
of the act.
COMPENSATION COVERAGE OF THE JUROR
In the case of a juror seeking workmen's compensation bene-
fits, two questions should be answered. First, can the benefits be
granted? Second, should the benefits be granted? The first ques-
tion requires an interpretation of the applicable workmen's com-
pensation act; the second question involves considerations of public
policy.
In answering the first question consideration should be given
to three requirements which are expressed or implied in most com-
pensation acts. These are the requirements of an employment con-
tract, of the payment of wages, and of the existence of control
over the employee.
The first requirement is the most difficult. At first blush the
requirement of a contract between the juror and the county ap-
pears to be met. The terms are definite and both parties agree
to them. The difficulty arises if a court insists that the juror
not only must agree to the terms, but must agree voluntarily.
There appears to be no adequate reason for so insisting; it seems
sufficient that the juror willingly complies with the terms of the
agreement. The fact that his willingness to comply may stem from
a desire not to be held in contempt of court appears immaterial.
Alternatively, if a court does choose to insist that the juror's agree-
ment be voluntary, such a difficulty can be surmounted by declar-
ing that the juror's agreement is voluntary in the contemplation
of the lawJ
6
The second requirement of the compensation acts is that the
employee must receive financial consideration for his services.
74. 149 Okla. 23, 299 P. 155 (1931).
75. 206 N.C. 206, 173 S.E. 603 (1934).
76. See Rector v. Cherry Valley Timber Co., 115 Wash. 31, 33, 196
P. 653, 653 (1921).
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This requirement presents little difficulty unless it be deemed that
the fees given jurors are meant not as consideration, but as gratui-
ties to cover expenses.
7
The third requirement is that of control. This requirement is
generally present only by implication from the common law defini-
tion of an employee. The control requirement has caused confu-
sion among the courts. The confusion has arisen from their failure
to distinguish between physical and mental control. Courts which
hold that a county has no control over its jurors apparently mean
that the county cannot control its jurors' mental processes.78 It is
clear, however, that a county has considerable physical control over
its jurors. Evidence of this physical control is furnished by the
Evans case 79 in which the juror contracted pneumonia because he
was forced to remain overnight in a jail without a blanket. If a
court insists that control over the employee is a requirement for
workmen's compensation coverage, the term "control" should be
interpreted in the common law sense of physical control unless
modified by statute. And clearly there is sufficient physical con-
trol over jurors for the common law requirement of physical con-
trol to be met.
A consideration of these three requirements of the compensa-
tion acts suggests that benefits can be granted without violating
the typical compensation statute. The second question yet remains.
Should the benefits be granted? The answer is suggested by the
general rule that a compensation act should be liberally construed
so as to extend its benefits to as many types of employments and
services as possible. 0
The argument has been made that the juror may be in a better
position if he is denied compensation coverage. This argument
assumes that the juror could bring a civil suit against the county.
The bringing of a suit may not be possible because of governmental
immunity.81 Even if it is possible, however, there appears to be no
sufficient reason for singling out the juror and holding that it
would be more advantageous for him to sue than to seek compensa-
tion benefits. If workmen's compensation is beneficial to others,
77. Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 363 Mich. 648, 668, 110 N.W.2d
780, 784 (1961).
78. See, e.g., Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240
(1966).
79. Board of Comm'rs. v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1936).
80. Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 363 Mich. 648, 656, 110 N.W.2d 780,
789 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
81. See Cox v. City of Cushing, 309 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1957). See
generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125 (3rd ed. 1964).
there is adequate reason to assume that it is also beneficial to
jurors. If it is beneficial to jurors, it appears that jurors should be
deemed to be covered by compensation law.
CONCLUSION
Courts are divided in their treatment of workmen's compensa-
tion claims by nonvoluntary workers. In some cases the nonvolun-
tary worker has been accorded compensation benefits. In other
cases, the requirement of a contract of hire has been held to bar
recovery.
The issue of whether or not the contract requirement should
bar the nonvoluntary worker's recovery is a close one. Both sides
of the issue are supportable. It is submitted that the determinative
factor in considering the issue should be public policy. Workmen's
compensation is an instrument of public policy and it should be
wielded so as to best suit the public interest.
Considerations of public policy are implicit in the decisions
discussed in this Note. Thus a laboring prisoner has uniformly
been excluded from compensation coverage, while an impressed
citizen has uniformly been deemed covered. Since these two situa-
tions are otherwise similar, it appears that the difference in the
decisions is attributable to a belief that the services rendered by
an impressed citizen are in the public interest whereas the services
of a prisoner are not.
If considerations of public policy require coverage of impressed
citizens and non-coverage of prisoners, then clearly these policy
considerations should also require coverage of jurors. This conclu-
sion follows from the fact that the services of a juror are as much
in the public interest as are the services of an impressed citizen.
Coverage of jurors is thus supportable in terms of statutory
interpretation and preferable in terms of public policy. For both
of these reasons, it is submitted that jurors should be deemed
covered by compensation law.
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